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COMMON CURRENCY FOR THE WEST AFRICAN SUB-REGION:
PROSPECTS FOR NIGERIA
Abstract
An important element of the economic integration process in
West Africa is the achievement of monetary co-operation which
can take various forms such as the clearing house mechanism,
European Monetary System Model, Parallel Union Currency
Model and Common Currency Area. The paper traced the efforts
by ECOWAS at evolving monetary co-operation and also
analysed the prospects for Nigeria of a common currency in the
West African sub-region. The paper identified and discussed the
costs and benefits of a common currency to member nations,
especially Nigeria. The costs include loss of autonomy by
individual governments in major areas of monetary and fiscal
policy, costly exchange rate adjustment and lower banking system
credit to government. On the other hand, the beneficial effects
include a possible increase in capital inflow and investment, an
enlarged market for Nigeria's exports, reduction in smuggling
and perhaps a more effective control of government deficit
financing. On balance, however, the paper concluded that a
common currency for the West African sub-region would be
beneficial to all the countries within the Region and Nigeria in
particular.

In Article 2(h) of the Treaty establishing it, the Community
pledged to ensure " the harmonization, required for the proper
functioning of the community, of the monetary policies of
member States." Also Article 36 l(b) provides that the Trade,
Customs, Immigration, Monetary and Payments Commission
among other things, should "as soon as practicable make
recommendations for the harmonization of the economic and
fiscal policies of the member States."
In furtherance of this objective, the Executive Secretariat of
ECOW AS in collaboration with the Committee of Governors of
Central Banks in ECOWAS has, in a number of studies
undertaken with technical assistance from various international
institutions, examined the broad principles and guidelines that
could be adopted in achieving greater regional monetary
co-operation.
The aim of this paper is partly to trace the efforts made so
far by the Community at evolving a monetary co-operation
programme for the sub-region, and partly to analyse the prospects
for Nigeria of a common currency for the West African subregion. For purposes of easy exposition, the paper is divided into
5 parts. Part I outlines briefly, the issues of concepts and
alternative arrangements for monetary co-operation. Part II
provides an historical analysis of the monetary co-operation effort
so far made, which culminated in the recent adoption of the
monetary co-operation programme by the Authority of Heads
of State and Government at its meeting in Abuja. Parts Ill and
IV examine the problems, costs and benefits of adopting a
common currency. Part V provides the summary and conclusion.

Introduction
A principal objective of the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) has been the achievement of greater
monetary co-operation through the harmonization and coordination of monetary and fiscal policies of its member States.

PART I DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS
Monetary Zone
A monetary zone (union) may be defined as an area with a
single currency or an area that has achieved monetary integration
with complete exchange rate unification. Thus, two or more
countries are said to have formed a monetary zone if they have
agreed to introduce a common currency to replace their existing
currencies, or in the alternative agree to a permanent monetary
co-operation arrangement which ensures that their currencies are
fully convertible at exchange rates which bear a permanently fixed
relationship to each other and vary in unison against non-union
currencies. Whatever form a monetary union may take, the
following basic requirements must be satisfied:

a great degree of independent national action in economic and
monetary policy formulation and implementation to the fullest
monetary and economic union. In increasing order of integration,
the options may be listed as follows:
(a) monetary co-operation through a clearing house
mechanism;
(b) European monetary system model;
(c) parallel union currency model;
(d) common currency area.
Clearing House Mechanism
A Clearing House system may be defined as an arrangement
among central banks whereby intra-regional transactions are
recorded and payments made on a pre-determined date when a
reconciliation of the accounts is made and settlement of the net
outstanding balances is effected. Examples of such clearing
mechanism in Africa are the West African Clearing House
(WACH), Central Africa Clearing House (CACH), and East
Africa Clearing House (EACH). The main objectives of such
Clearing House system are to increase the use of national
currencies, and economise on the use of hard currencies, for the
intra-regional trade, as well as encourage a greater trade
liberalisation within the region or sub-region. Through this
mechanism , national currencies achieve a form of limited
convertibility within the region.

(a) a common monetary policy;
(b) a common pool of foreign exchange reserves and common
exchange rate policy;
(c) harmonization of domestic credit through the imposition
of maximum credit ceilings;
(d) a common central bank;
(e) a common currency.

Alternative arrangements for Monetary Co-operation
There are various forms of monetary co-operation. The
different forms may in a sense be viewed as stages or degrees of
integration beginning with a very loose association that permits
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European Monetary System (EMS) Model

of independent countries into a monetary zone with a single
currency and a union central bank. The union central bank
performs the primary functions of:
(a) issuance of the common currency;
(b) holding and management of the external assets of the
member countries in a common pool;
(c) management of the monetary policy in order to facilitate
monetary stability and the full and unlimited
convertibility of their common currency against an
external reference currency to which it is immutably
pegged.
This model exists among the French-speaking countries of West
Africa (WAMU), Central Africa and East Caribbean.

The EMS is an arrangement by the participating European
countries to ensure closer financial and monetary co-operation
and create a zone of monetary stability in the European
Community. The system involves the harmonization of exchange
rates through co-operative intervention in their foreign exchange
markets to minimize exchange risks in their trade and other
economic relations. The EMS replaced the "Snake" which was
a system set up to narrow fluctuations among the currencies of
EEC countries. Under the EMS model, participating countries
retain substantial national autonomy in most major areas of
economic and financial policy formulation .
Parallel Union Currency Model

This is a system whereby a common union currency is issued
to circulate side by side with national currencies to which it has
a defined and fixed relationship. A major element of the system
is the establishment of a union monetary authority with powers
to issue the parallel as well as the national currencies.
In this system, national central banks will be retained but their
existing autonomy in monetary and credit management will be
reduced in favour of the union monetary authority.

Evaluation of Options

Studies have indicated that of the above alternative models of
integration, a single currency system, similar to the W AMU
model, provides the most meaningful framework for translating
the aspirations of the ECOWAS Authority into a concrete
programme. It should be expected that there will be a short period
of transition from a system of parallel currencies to a single
currency system. In that period, both the common currency and
the national currencies will circulate side by side until the national
currencies are finally withdrawn from circulation.

The Single (common) Currency Model

This model involves an arrangement which groups a number

PART II TOWARDS THE CREATION OF A SINGLE ECOWAS MONETARY ZONE
The proposal for a common currency for the West African subregion dates back to May, 1983 when at its meeting in Conakry,
the Authority of the Heads of State and Government of
ECOW AS took a decision that studies be commissioned on the
possibility of creati ng a single monetary zone in the ECOW AS
sub-region. Following that decision, the Committee of Governors
of Central Banks of ECOWAS at its meeting in Dakar in
September 1983, set up a Study Group under the auspices of the
ECOW AS Secretariat. The report of the Study Group was
submitted in two phases. The revised Phase II report - the final
report - was submitted to the committee of Governors at their
meetings in Nouakchott, Mauritania, in April, 1987.
The Study Group in its reports proposed a monetary zone of
the WAMU type for ECOWAS. It proposed a transitional period
of five years (1988-1992) before the single ECOWAS monetary
zone could be created. During that period, some countries,
including Nigeria, are required to adopt specific corrective policy
measures to remove sources of disharmony arising particularly
from exchange rate and monetary and fiscal policies of the
Government. The adjustment measures recommended are to be
undertaken by the non-members of the !'Union Monetaire Ouest
Africaine (UMOA) to harmonise their policies with those that
obtain among the seven member French-speaking countries of
the UMOA.
The policy measures include exchange rate adjustment; ceiling
on government borrowing from the banking system; appropriate
distribution of bank credit between government and private
sectors; and fiscal harmonisation.
The monetary union envisaged is based on the common
currency model with the following characteristics:
(i) a common central bank;
(ii) a common convertible currency to replace existing
national currencies;

(iii) pooled external reserves;
(iv) the centralisation of short-term domestic and external
liabilities of national central banks in the common central
bank;
(v) the re-designation of existing national central banks; and
(vi) a convertibility guarantee agreement with the issuer of
a major international currency in order to ensure stability
and international confidence in the new common
currency.
After considering the report at the Nouakchott meeting, the
Committee of Governors accepted the report and decided to adopt
a phased approach to ECOWAS Monetary Co-operation. The
phased approach, according to the Committee, is the gradualist
one, reflecting the time profile of objectives to be pursued. The
pursuit of the short-term objective will be directed towards
improvement and strengthening of the West African Clearing
House (WACH) mechanism to facilitate increased intra-regional
trade and payments transactions through greater use of national
currencies. In the medium-term, efforts will be made towards the
achievement of limited convertibility, while the creation of a single
monetary zone with a common currency is the long-term
objective. The recommendation was submitted to the Finance
Ministers of ECOWAS at their meeting in Abuja in June, I 987.
The Finance Ministers considered and adopted the
recommendation, including the setting up of an interim coordinating committee comprising representatives of all the central
banks, Ministries of Finance and the Executive Secretariat to
undertake the necessary follow-up action on details of the
programme. The Ministers of Finance submitted their
recommendation to the 21st session of the Council of Ministers
of ECOWAS which was held in Abuja from 3rd to 6th July, 1987.
In considering the report on the proposed monetary cooperation programme, the Council stressed the importance of
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should be on a gradual and pragmatic basis.
The above narrative on the creation o f a single ECOWAS
Monetary zone, however, will be incomplete if it is silent on two
unanswered questions. These relate to the convertibility guarantee
for the common currency and the pooling of foreign exchange
reserves of member states in the common central bank. Agreement
has not been reached with any country or group of countries on
convertibility guarantee. Although the report of the Study Group
suggests that the European Economic Community (EEC) could
be contacted over the issue, this has not been done. Also
problematic is the pooling of external reserves. In this case, the
exact modalities for the management and utilisation of the pooled
reserves are yet to be agreed upon. It is to be hoped, nonetheless,
that these issues will be pursued by the proposed interim coordinating committee during the five-year transitional period
1988-1992.

monetary co-operation in view of the problems posed by the
multiplicity of currencies to the sub-regional integration process.
In this connection, the Executive Secretariat of ECOWAS was
requested to develop the community co-operation programmes
in trade, monetary, transport and communications sectors into
coherent package to ensure the required complementarity. The
Council underscored the need for strong political will in
implementing the proposed monetary co-operation programme.
The Council thereafter forwarded the proposals to the Authority
of Heads of State and Government for consideration.
In considering the proposal, the Authority at its Tenth Ordinary
Session held at Abuja from 7th to 9th July 1987, welcomed the
progress recorded on the preparations towards the creation of
a single monetary zone in West Africa. The Authority adopted
the proposed ECOW AS Monetary Co-operation Programme. It
decided, however, that the creation of a single monetary zone

PART III COSTS OF ADOPTING A COMMON CURRENCY FOR ECOWAS
There will be costs as well as benefits for Nigeria, like every
other country in ECOWAS, in adopting a common currency for
the sub-region.
The costs are in the form of some painful policy adjustment
measures that have to be undertaken by the non-UMOA countries
of the sub-region during the transitional period and the permanent
loss of sovereignty over the conduct of monetary and fiscal
policies.

Banking System Credit to Government
The Study Group proposed adjustment in fiscal policies aimed
at monetary stability and sustainable economic growth.
Specifically, the Group recommended that ceiling on Central
Bank credit to Government should not exceed 20 per cent of
previous year's fiscal revenue during the transitional period. The
20 per cent ceiling was chosen by the Study Group to bring all
ECOWAS countries in line with the practice in UMOA countries.
However, the Committee of Governors at the Nouakchott
meeting modified the recommendation of the Study Group by
agreeing that the 20 per cent ceiling should apply to credit from
both central bank and commercial banks to government. When
we examined the effects of limiting the Federal Government
borrowing from the banking system to only 20 per cent of the
preceding year's fiscal revenue defined as federally-collected
revenue, for the period 1982-1986, we found that this would have
constrained Government expenditure severely. A comparison of
the actual banking system's credit to Government in the period
with the proposed 20 per cent ceiling shows that the actual was
higher than would have been allowed in every year except 1986.
The highest deviation was in 1983 when actual credit exceeded
the 20 per cent benchmark by 27. 7 percentage points.
The constraint on Government expenditure becomes even more
serious when federal-retained revenue which appears more
relevant in the case of Nigeria is used as fiscal revenue in the
analysis. In this, we found that the banking system's credit to
Government as a proportion of previous year's fiscal revenue
averaged 40.6 per cent between 1983 and 1986. On this basis, the
actual credit to government exceeded the 20 per cent ceiling by
very wide margin. It is obvious that the 20 per cent ceiling would
impose severe restraint on government deficit financing. However,
under the structural adjustment programme, Government deficit
financing is being reduced. Thus, further reduction to meet
ECOWAS requirement will not be as severe as it would have been.

Initial Adjustment Measures to be undertaken by Member States
(a) Exchange Rate Adjustments
The Study Group Report considered exchange rate adjustment
by the non-UMOA member countries of ECOWAS as the most
important of the adjustments to be made before the formation
of the proposed ECOW AS Monetary Zone. This stemmed from
the report of the Group which found large divergences in the
exchange rate policies of ECOWAS member countries and that
the exchange rates of most of the non-UMOA countries were
over-valued. Using the exchange rate of the CFA franc as a
benchmark and on the basis of data for end-1985, the report,
for example, recommended that Ghana should devalue its
currency from that date by 61.3 per cent, Sierra Leone by 51.7
per cent, while Nigeria was to devalue the naira by 74 per cent.
The report, however, found that the Gambian Dalasi was undervalued and recommended that it be re-valued by 59.2 per cent.
The purpose of the exchange rate adjustment by the non-UMOA
countries was to align the currencies of all member countries of
ECOWAS to the CFA franc. It was also to bring the exchange
rates of all currencies in the sub-region into harmony with an
existing major regional convertible currency, the CFA franc,
which is collectively managed in a manner similar to that
envisaged in the proposed ECOWAS monetary zone.
The dramatic fall in the value of the naira, particularly since
the introduction of the Second-Tier Foreign Exchange Market,
will make any further adjustment of the naira rate unnecessary.
For instance, between December 1985 and September 26, 1986,
the naira depreciated by 38.8 per cent against the dollar (See Table
I). Following the introduction of SFEM, the naira depreciated
against the dollar more sharply, resulting in a total depreciation
of 74. 7 per cent between December I 985 and July 1987. The
recommended reduction in the value of the naira has therefore
been met.

Permanent Costs
As indicated above, these costs include the loss of autonomy
by individual national governments in major areas of monetary
and fiscal policies to a supra-national central authority, loss in
the use of exchange rate policy as an instrument for balance of
payments adjustment. Other costs may arise from the problems
of acceptability of the common currency and the convertibility
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guarantee agreement to be reached with the issuer of a major
international currency.

Convertibility Guarantee Agreement
The convertibility guarantee agreement recommended to be
made with the issuer of a major international convertible currency
will no doubt serve to ensure the stability and convertibility of
the ECOWAS currency. The agreement will, however, have both
econom ic and political costs. No country of group of countries
will give such a guarantee without setting conditions. For example,
under a co-operation agreement signed by individual member
countries of the West African Monetary Union with France, the
latter guarantees the full convertibility of the CFA franc at a fixed
rate of exchange, while the member states of the Union are under
obligation to keep their common external reserves in an
"Operations Account" maintained with the French Treasury.
However, there have been some modifications to this since that
agreement was first signed. The BCEAO , the Union's Central
Bank, is now permitted to invest up to 35 per cent of its reserves
in short-term liquid assets of two years maturity in the
international financial markets in which member countries are
participating. From this, it could be expected that any country
guaranteeing the convertibility of the common currency will set
some conditions, which may have impact on the autonomy of
the individual ECOWAS countries.

Constraints on monetary and fiscal policies
A monetary union, as mentioned earlier in this lecture, requires
the establishment of a central monetary authority for the subregion. As a result, decisions relating to monetary policies would
have to be made at the central monetary authority level and the
flexibility for individual country's budgetary deficits would be
limited through collective decision making. Every independent
country ordinarily wants to be able to control the volume of
money in the economy according to its perceived need of the
economy. Th is national independent discretion will no longer be
possible in a currency union. Similarly, the flexibility of fiscal
policy in the union will be constrained by the limits set collectively
on banking system financing of government budgetary deficits.
Loss of the use of Exchange Rate as an internal Policy Instrument
for Balance of Payments Adjustment
Exchange rate is an important internal policy instrument for
moderating imported inflation and also for controlling imports
into the country. It has also been used to boost non-oil exports.
This internal policy instrument for adjusting our balance of
payments posit ion will no longer be available with the adoption
of a common currency.

Migration of the nationals of other countries of the sub-region
into Nigeria
There is some concern that adopting a common currency in
the sub-region will lead to an influx of other nationals of the subregion into Nigeria. Nigeria, of course, is the most developed
country in the West African sub-region, enjoying a more
advanced infrastructure and industries. It is also probably the
most wealthy of the countries in the sub-region. As a result, other
nationals have been coming into Nigeria to obtain employment.
The adoption of a common currency will make it earlier for other
nationals to come and settle in the country. With time, however,
some Nigerians will also move out to other countries of the subregion to take up foreign jobs, though there is likely to be a net
migration of labour into Nigeria.

Partial Surrender of national sovereignty
A national currency is regarded as a symbol of sovereignty and
the replacement of the national currency by a common currency
issued by a supra-national body is a surrender of sovereignty in
this regard. The transfer of autonomy in the major areas of the
monetary policy to a central monetary authority already
mentioned is included in the partial surrender of sovereignty.
This, no doubt, is the highest price that Nigeria, like all the
other non-UMOA countries of the sub-region, has to pay for
entering into the ECOWAS monetary union. In fact, whether
the monetary zone programme is realised or not will depend
largely on the willingness of the governments concerned to
surrender autonomy in this regard.

PART IV BENEFITS FROM COMMON CURRENCY IN ECOWAS
pressures on the balance of payments. Also, the distribution of
bank credit between the private and government sectors will be
more objective and beneficial. It must also be noted that the loss
over monetary and fiscal control will not be a total loss since the
Nigerian Government will be represented at the policy making
body of ECOWAS central bank.

Nigeria will certainly derive some benefits from the proposed
adoption of a com mon currency for ECOWAS. The likely
benefits are discussed briefly below.

(a) Monetary and Fiscal Policies
The loss of control over major areas of monetary and fiscal
policies by the Nigerian Government under the common currency
system was described above as the highest price to pay. However,
looked at from another angle it would be seen that it confers some
significant benefits. For instance, the fixing of a ceiling on
Government borrowing from the banking system by ECOWAS
central bank would lead to a more effective control of government
deficit financing and inflationary pressures in the economy. The
history of inflation in the Nigerian economy in recent years shows
that inflationary pressures were fuelled by excessive government
deficit financing. An effective control of banking system credit
to government is also likely to make government more costconscious and avoid wasteful spending. It may also induce
government to increase its drive in raising revenue. Moreover,
a better control of credit to government will also tend to reduce

Increase in capital inflow and investments
The common currency envisaged for the sub-region will be
externally convertible through the convertibility guarantee
agreement. This will certainly be a major benefit. The discipline
imposed on member countries by the limits set by the collective
decision-making process on the ability of any one member to
follow excessively expansionary policies will have positive effects
on both external and internal financial stability. All these will
enhance the inflow of capital t hat will lead to increased
investments. Also the presence of many industries already in
Nigeria would provide external economies to new industries, and
thus could make the industrial sectors in Nigeria, areas of growth
within the sub-region, attracting capital and investment.
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Large Market for N igeria's exports on the West Coast
One of the reasons for the low level of intra-West African subregional trade is the multiplicity of inconvertible currencies in
the sub-region. The adoption of a single currency will therefore
facilitate intra-subregional trade. Nigeria will be one of the
greatest beneficiaries because of its export potential in the
sub-region.
Intensification of efforts in promoting exports to the industrial
countries is not likely to be very successful because of protectionist
measures in the industrial countries . In any case, a recent
UNCT AD study has shown that African countries in particular
have little or no chance of penetrating industrial countries markets
as did Taiwan, South Korea and Hong Kong for both economic
and political reasons. If the objective of increasing Nigeria's nonoil exports is to be achieved our export promotio n drive would
have to be directed more to the developing world and more

especially to the ECOW AS countries. The adoption of a common
currency will facilitate and promote this drive.
Reduction in smuggling and incidence of illegal trafficking
The Centralised monetary and fiscal management strategies
required under a common currency have a better ability to reduce
the basic imbalance in t he economies of member states of the
union. Smuggling of goods and currency trafficking will therefore
be considerably reduced . There will be no incentive to smuggle
to earn other member countries' currency in order to buy their
goods or to smuggle currency for exchange into hard currencies.
Increase in tourism
A common currency will encourage free movement of people
within the sub-region. With the movement, more tourist attraction
will be discovered and Nigeria has many.

PART V SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This paper has traced briefly from the genesis to the current
position o f the monetary co-operation efforts in the West African
sub-region. It has also attempted an analysis of the practical
problems, costs and benefits for Nigeria on entering ECOWAS
monetary union.
It is shown that the subject of monetary co-operation in
ECOWAS sub-region has been extensively studied by financial
experts, and that the experts' reports (in two phases) have, after
necessary revision, been accepted by the ECOW AS political
leaders - the Council of Ministers and the Authority of the Heads
of State and Government. A programme of phased approach to
the creation of an ECOW AS monetary zone was fi nally approved
by the Authority of the Heads of State and Government at its
10th ordinary session at Abuja, Nigeria, in July 1987 . The
Authority, however, stressed that the creation of an ECOWAS
monetary zone must be pursued on a gradual and pragmatic basis.
An ECOWAS Monetary Union will impose some costs on
Nigeria and also confer some benefits. The main costs are in terms
o f some painful initial eco nomic measures it will be required to
take and the loss of autonomy over the conduct of monetary,
fiscal, a nd exchange rate policies, which has to be surrendered
to a supra-national ECOW AS Central Bank.
On the other hand, the benefits that will accrue to Nigeria on
joining the ECOWAS Monetary Union appear considerable. The

most obvious ones include a large market covering the whole of
West Africa, more effective and objective control on government
deficit financing, consequently leading to more monetary stability
and reduction in inflationary pressures. Others a re reduction or
elimination of currency trafficking and smuggling of goods across
the borders; thanks to having a convertible currency for the whole
sub-region. Other benefits include increased capital inflow and
investment.
It would thus appear from the foregoing analysis that the
prospects for Nigeria in joining the ECOWAS Monetary Zone
are bright. A major barrier to intra-ECOWAS trade has been
shortage of foreign exchange. Thus a commo n convertible
currency for the sub-region which is one of the collective actions
for self-reliance being pu rsued in the sub-region must, if properly
implemented, be beneficial to all concerned. In order to maximise
this benefit, other barriers to trade within the sub-region - both
financial and non-financial - must be removed.

N. E. Ogbe

Director of Research
Central Bank of Nigeria
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NAIRA EXCHA GE RATE DEVELOPM E TS SINCE
DECEMBER 1985

December 1985 ......... .
September 26 1986 ...... .
September 29 1986 ... .. . .
December 1986 ......... .
May 14 1987 ........... .
J une 4 1987 ... ... .. .... .
J une 18 1987 ........... .
J uly 2 1987 .......... . . .
July 16 1987 ......... . . .
Average SFEM / FEM Rate
(September 29, 1986 July 16, 1987) .......... .

Depreciation
fro m December 1985

Rates

Dates

Table I

N l.0 = $1.0422
Nl.5691 = $ 1.0
N4.6174 = $ 1.0
N3.3166 = $1.0
N4. 1617 = $1.0
N4.3637 = $1.0
N3.7375 = $1.0
N3.9899 = $1.0
N3.5354 = $1.0

- 38.8
- 79.2
- 71.0
- 76.9
-78.0
-74.3
- 75 .9
- 72.8

N3.7985 = $1.0

- 74.7

Table 2

GOVER MENT REVENUE A D GROSS BORROWING, 1981-1986

Federally-collected Revenue ( N ' Million) ... ..... .
Federal Govt. Borrowing from:'
The Banking System ............ .. ...... ... .
(I) Central Bank ... . .... . . . .. . .. .... .... .
(2) Commercial Banks ... ..... .. .. .. .. . . . .

1981

1982

12,180.2

1986

11 ,764.4

1983
10,508.7

1984
11 ,133.7

1985
14,606.1

14, 189.9

2,989.2
(1,975.9)
(1,013.3)

5,616.1
(3,324.9)
(2,291.2)

2,892.5
( - 646.0)
(3,538.5)

2,491.4
(820.5)
(1,670.9)

498.9
(6, 199.7)
(5,700.8)

22 .4
(7.4)
(15.0)

3.4
(42.4)
( - 39.0)

PERCENTAGES
Federal Government Borrowing as percentage of
Federally collected revenue in previous year:
From the Banking System .. ... ... .... .. ..... .
(! ) Central Bank .. ... ... .......... . ..... .
(2) Commercial Banks ..... ....... .... ... .

24.5
(16.2)
(8.3)

P ermissible Borrowing under the proposed 20o/o
ceiling .... .. ... ..... . .... .. ..... .. .... . ..... .

2,436.0

1

47.7
(28.2)
(19.5)
2,352.9

27.5
( - 6.1)
(33.6)
2,101.7

2,226.7

2,921.2

T his measures changes in holding of Government Securities. It is not adj usted for Federal Government deposits or for Federal
borrowing on-lent to State Governments.

Source: Central Bank of Nigeria
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